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Abstract
Although Canada is known as a liberal welfare regime, universality is a key issue in that country, as several major social pro-
grams are universal in both their core principles and coverage rules. The objective of this article is to discuss the meaning
of universality and related concepts before exploring the development of individual universal social programs in Canada,
with a particular focus on health care and old-age pensions. More generally, the article shows how universality can exist
and become resilient within a predominantly liberal welfare regime due to the complex and fragmented nature of mod-
ern social policy systems, in which policy types vary from policy area to policy area, and even from program to program
within the same policy area. The broader analysis of health care and old-age pensions as policy areas illustrates this general
claim. This analysis looks at the historical development and the politics of provincial universal health coverage since the
late 1950s and at the evolution of the federal Old Age Security program since its creation in the early 1950s. The main
argument of this article is that universality as a set of principles remains stronger in health care than in pensions yet key
challenges remain in each of these policy areas. Another contention is that there are multiple and contested universalisms
in social policy.
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1. Introduction
Although universality is typically linked with the social
democratic welfare regime associated with Scandinavian
countries such as Denmark and Sweden, universal so-
cial programs exist in the other welfare regimes, includ-
ing liberal regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Regardless
of the country and welfare regime, however, it is clear
that growing demographic, economic, and fiscal pres-
sures have led scholars such as Neil Gilbert (2002) to
talk about a rise of social policy targeting and a decline
of universality in advanced industrial countries. Other
scholars reject this idea of a “universal decline of uni-
versality,” arguing that universality remains strong in
many advanced industrial countries categorized as both
social democratic and liberal welfare regimes (Béland,
Blomqvist, Goul Andersen, Palme,&Waddan, 2014). This
is in part because the liberal welfare regime, based on
the primacy of individual rights rather than on the notion
of collective responsibility embedded in the social demo-
cratic welfare regime, can still lean towards specific uni-
versal policy interventions, if it offers greater equality in
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terms of individual opportunity (Esping-Andersen, 1990;
Spicker, 2013)
The objective of this article is to contribute to this on-
going debate about the fate of social policy universality
in contemporary advanced industrial societies by exam-
ining Canada, a liberal welfare regime in which universal
social programs have long played a central role (for an
overview see Rice & Prince, 2013). Our contribution to
this debate is both theoretical and empirical. First, we
offer a critical discussion of three key concepts that are
used in this debate: universalism, universality, and uni-
versalization. Second, we discuss the historical and the
recent fate of universality in Canada by comparing and
contrasting the situation prevailing in the two largest so-
cial policy areas in terms of social spending: health care
and old-age pensions. This comparative analysis suggests
that universality has proved relatively resilient in these
two policy areas, in contrast to what has been witnessed
in other components of the Canadian welfare regime
such as family benefits. The article concludes with a
summary of the findings leading to a broader discussion
about the history and fate of universality in liberal wel-
fare regimes such as Canada.
2. Universalism, Universality, and Universalization
To better analyse universal social policy, we introduce
three core concepts—namely, universalism, universality,
and universalization. These concepts relate to important
political ideas, prominent policy instruments, and social
processes of change in program design and service deliv-
ery. Associated with each of these concepts are a num-
ber of complementary notions as well as counter-ideas
that together constitute the normative and ideological
context of universal social policy in contemporary wel-
fare states.
In brief, universalism is associated with, among other
ideas, the corresponding notions of equality and solidar-
ity alongside the contending ideas of diversity and partic-
ularism, universality with the complementary notions of
accessibility and social rights (that benefits and services
should be available unconditionally as amatter of citizen-
ship or residency) plus the competing ideas of selectiv-
ity and deservingness, and universalization with accom-
panying concepts of belonging and decommodification
in opposition to the concepts of separating, categorizing,
and privatizing.
Universalism, like other “isms,” is a complex, dy-
namic, and contested discourse of public beliefs. It refers
to sets of attitudes, principles, ideas, arguments, nor-
mative theories, and frameworks of values expressed by
specific individuals, groups, institutions, and social move-
ments. From the academic literature and from public dis-
course, three dimensions to universalism can be identi-
fied. These are universalism as: (1) a vision or visions of
preferred relations between citizens, governments, com-
munities, andmarkets; (2) political claims for and against
universal approaches in social policymaking and public
services; and (3) a body of academic concepts and theo-
ries on social policy and the welfare state.
Universalism articulates explicit conceptions on the
state, civil society, families, the market economy, and so-
cial policy that can be understood as beliefs regarding a
desired mix of responsibilities between and among state
and non-state actors in social policy and program provi-
sion. Favoured ideas in universalism include communal
responsibility, equity, and sharing; equality of opportu-
nity and status for all; and the importance of social in-
clusion and integration. Other connected “isms” include
social democratic versions of collectivism, egalitarianism,
and nationalism. In liberal welfare states such as Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom, strong
counter-isms to universalism include economic liberal-
ism, market individualism, traditional familism, and neo-
conservatism. More specifically in the Canadian context,
beliefs about preferred arrangements between state and
society link up to ideas of constitutionalism, federalism,
and the division of powers, inter-regional redistribution,
and the equal treatment of citizens across the coun-
try with regard to uniform rules on eligibility, benefit
amounts, and benefit duration (Rice & Prince, 2013).
Academic theories about social policy customarily
supportive of universalism include relative conceptions
of poverty measures rather than absolute measures; so-
cial rights as integral components of modern citizen-
ship regimes; and institutional and redistributive welfare
models rather than a residual model for addressing indi-
vidual and community needs. More recently, from femi-
nist scholars and critical policy analysts, are the concepts
of false universalism, differentiated universalism, and in-
teractive universalism (Lister, 2003). These concepts in-
terrogate assumptions about the disembodied and au-
tonomous citizen (and reveal this image to be an arti-
ficial universalism), question the supposed impartiality
of the universal, with a focus on who is included and
who is excluded, and, in our age of identity politics and
equality rights in a multinational state, suggest a synthe-
sis between the universal and the plural that seeks to em-
brace equality and diversity through notions of equity,
self-determination, dignity, and inclusion.
Universality is a distinctive governing instrument in
social policy which refers to public provisions in the form
of benefits, services, or general rules anchored in legisla-
tion instead of discretionary public sector programming
or provisions in the private sector, the domestic sector,
or the voluntary sector, including charitable measures.
Accessibility rests on citizenship or residency irrespective
of financial need or income, and the benefit or service or
rule is applicable to the general population (or a particu-
lar age group, such as children or older people) of a po-
litical jurisdiction. The operating principle for universal
provision is of equal benefits or equal access.
A further expression of this general sense of political
community is that financing universal programs is wholly
or primarily through general revenue sources. This points
to the direct link between general taxation and univer-
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sality because, in contrast to social insurance programs
which are typically financed through dedicated payroll
contributions paid mostly or wholly by workers and their
employers, universal programs depend on the flow of
general fiscal revenues associated with income taxes
(personal and corporate) and sales taxes. Universal social
programs offer social protection independent of one’s
contributions and labour market status. While social
assistance programs, like universal ones, are financed
through general revenues, they usually target the poor
(either through an income test or amore stringentmeans
test that takes into account both income and personal as-
sets). Universal benefits and services are granted based
on citizenship status or residency (sometimes supple-
mented by age criteria in the case of demogrants like Old
Age Security [OAS]), rather than need (social assistance)
or past contributions (social insurance).
Universalization refers to social processes of change
in program design and service delivery, and, we sug-
gest, comprises two related processes: discursive prac-
tices, and sequences of material and institutional pro-
cesses. The discursive involves such cultural activities as
the growing acceptance, circulation, and influence of uni-
versal ideas, values, and discourse in public discussions
and political debates. The material and institutional di-
mension of universalization involves concrete activities
by governments and other state agencies—for instance,
the adoption and extension of universality in design fea-
tures of income benefits, taxmeasures, and public goods
and services. In this respect, universalization indicates a
sustained growth in the number of universal programs
or an extension of the scope and adequacy of existing
universal social services, cash transfers, and social legis-
lation and human rights. To be sure, universalization has
implications for the scope of populations covered and for
the patterns of resource allocation and distribution be-
tween state and non-state actors.
Both the discursive and material processes con-
tribute to the institutionalization of social rights in a
multinational state, constructing distinctive policy archi-
tectures of universal values and provisions, in addition to
shaping the development of citizenship as a regime of en-
titlements and obligations. Moreover, this universaliza-
tion operates at a number of levels of social action, from
a single program such as old age pensions and broad pol-
icy areas such as universal elementary and secondary ed-
ucation and universal health coverage (UHC) to an over-
all welfare state (whether federal, provincial, or national)
and society in general.
Case studies of social policy areas and groups shed
important light on two questions related to universaliza-
tion: first, on the origins, nature, and extent of universal-
ization; and, second, on processes of de-universalization,
which entail the diminishment of universality as a pol-
icy instrument and the assertion of ideas of private re-
sponsibility, for example, as well as techniques related to
selectivity and categorical targeting (Béland,Marchildon,
& Prince, 2019). Social policy studies with historical and
comparative perspectives can reveal the rise and fall, and
perhaps the rise again, of certain ideas, interests, and in-
strument choices over an extended period, providing in-
sights into the vulnerability or resiliency of given social
programs and policy communities.
Countries with liberal welfare regimes, including
Canada, have created universal programs, which exist
alongside targeted social assistance and contributory so-
cial insurance programs, in large part because of the con-
siderable influence of labour and social democratic par-
ties and/or governments. In Canada, universality is dom-
inant in health care, while it is largely absent from in-
come security policy, a subfield dominated by social in-
surance (federal employment insurance) and social as-
sistance (provincial welfare). In contrast, the field of old
age pensions witnesses a close overlapping of univer-
sal programs (OAS), income-tested social assistance (the
Guaranteed Income Supplement [GIS]), and social insur-
ance (Canada Pension Plan [CPP]/Quebec Pension Plan
[QPP]) benefits. It is to the two policy areas of health care
and old-age pensions that we now turn.
3. Health Care
UHC—commonly known as Medicare in Canada—
emerged in stages in the quarter century immediately
following the end of the Second World War. More than
any other social policy, Medicare would become the
poster child program for universality in Canada. Similar
to the National Health Service (NHS) in the United
Kingdom, Medicare became the jewel in the crown of
the Canadian welfare state due to the average citizen’s
familiarity with its services and because of the absence
of any similar policy in the United States, a country with
which Canadians regularly compare themselves. In so-
cial democratic welfare regimes, UHC is based on citizen-
ship/residency rather than employment status or social
security contributions. Canadian Medicare too is based
on citizenship/residency, in this case on the simple fact
of residency in any of the 10 provinces and three territo-
ries that administerMedicare in this highly decentralized
federation. Although actual use of Medicare is triggered
by medical need, in fact the right to access is based on
the broader principle of citizenship.
Canada is far from unique among high-income coun-
tries in having UHC. However, the Canadian approach
reflects one of the strongest forms of universality in
the world (Marchildon, 2014). The majority of UHC sys-
tems in high-income countries permit a separate—albeit
highly regulated—private tier of hospital and other med-
ically necessary health services. This is done in various
ways including the public subsidization of private health
insurance supporting a private delivery system parallel
to the public system (e.g., Australia), the non-subsidized
purchase of private health services partly through execu-
tive benefit packages (e.g., United Kingdom), or the re-
quired opting out of UHC by citizens earning above a
specified threshold of income (e.g., Germany). In Canada,
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none of these forms are encouraged and some are pro-
hibited. Instead, Medicare is built upon a single-tier
of publicly-financed health facilities even if delivery in-
volves a highly mixed and decentralized system of public
and private delivery agents (Deber, 2004). Being a decen-
tralized federation, provincial governments rather than
the central government are responsible for ensuring cov-
erage as well as financing all Medicare services so that
they are free at the point of access. Although there are
multiple provincial single-payer UHC systems, they are
held together through broad standards set by the fed-
eral government that must be met by provincial govern-
ments in order to receive their full per capita share of the
Canada Health Transfer (Marchildon, 2013; Tuohy, 2009).
This single-tier embodies the right of all citizens to ac-
cess the same services in the same facilities without a pri-
vate class or “business-class” tier of higher-quality health
services relative to publicly-financed Medicare services.
This single-tier aspect was the product of a design suc-
cessfully implemented in the only Canadian province
with an elected social democratic government—the
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) which
would later morph into the New Democratic Party (Dyck
& Marchildon, 2018). These single-payer and single-tier
characteristics were essential attributes of the universal
hospital coverage program introduced by the CCF govern-
ment in Saskatchewan in January 1947 (some 18months
before the NHS was implemented) and the universal
medical care program implemented by the same admin-
istration in July 1962 after a lengthy struggle with or-
ganized medicine. These design features were accepted
by both Liberal and Progressive Conservative administra-
tions at the federal level and embedded in the condi-
tions and standards set by successive federal administra-
tions, most recently in the Canada Health Act of 1984.
Over time, Canadians came to see this strong form of
universality as an attribute of citizenship (Cohn, 2005;
Romanow, 2002).
Despite the political and popular consensus in favour
of Canadian-style Medicare, there has always been a vo-
cal and powerful minority opposed to the strong form of
universalism associated with Medicare. Moreover, in re-
cent years, the critiques of Medicare have grown and its
basic design principles challenged through the courts. In
particular, anti-Medicare forces have advocated for the
elimination of uniform coverage to allow for the right
to access private insurance and private services along
with the introduction of user fees will be necessary to ad-
dress the perceived shortcomings of Canadian Medicare
(Bliss, 2010; Blomqvist&Busby, 2015; Speer& Lee, 2016).
Increasingly, arguments against single-tier Medicare and
the underlying contending values are presented to the
courts in cases where plaintiffs argue that the provin-
cial laws and regulations that protect the single-tier as-
pect of provincial Medicare systems are contrary to in-
dividual rights as defined under the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in the Canadian Constitution (Flood &
Thomas, 2018).
While a growing coalition of forces on the political
right is attempting to limit Canadian Medicare, the left-
wing critique of Canadian Medicare is that the federal
government has not been assiduous enough in enforcing
national standards against recalcitrant provincial govern-
ments and this has led to a steady erosion of the prin-
ciple of access based on need rather than ability to pay.
Indeed, in some of Canada’s largest cities, it is possible to
avoid wait lists by paying for access to advanced diagnos-
tic tests and some elective but still medically necessary
day surgeries. This has created two-tier breaches in what
was intended to be a single-tier system.
The left’s other major critique of Canadian Medicare
is its narrowness. Coverage is limited to hospital, medi-
cal care—largely defined as physician services, drugs ad-
ministered within hospitals, and medically necessary di-
agnostic services. This means that universal coverage in
Canada is narrow compared to other high-income coun-
tries with UHC. Although expansion beyond this nar-
row basket was recommended in the past by two Royal
Commissions (Canada, 1964; Romanow, 2002) there has
been no significant change to the basic Medicare bas-
ket of covered services since the 1960s. At the same
time, an increasing proportion of health care service
is delivered outside of hospitals by non-physicians and
an increasing percentage of prescription drugs are con-
sumed outside of hospitals. Although the Medicare bas-
ket included something close to two-thirds of all health
care goods and services in Canada in the early 1970s,
today Medicare covers something less than one-half of
all health care as measured by expenditures—a passive
form of privatization or de-universalization.
By the end of the 1970s, provincial governments
had begun to fill in some of the gaps created by the
narrowness of Medicare through targeted and categori-
cal programs. For example, provincial prescription drug
plans were established as safety nets for those with-
out employment-based private health insurance. These
plans targeted retired individuals and social assistance re-
cipients. At the same time, provincial governments also
subsidized or provided some social care services includ-
ing home care and long-term facility care, largely se-
lective programmes based on means testing. Operating
without national standards, the coverage for such pro-
grammes is highly variable across the country. In particu-
lar, there is a deep east-west gradient in which public cov-
erage for prescription drugs and public subsidies and ser-
vices for social care are much thinner in Atlantic Canada
than in the rest of the country (Romanow, 2002).
There are also areas of health care that have been
almost exempt from public intervention and seem to
be subject to the market logic of a liberal state as de-
fined by Esping-Andersen (1990). Dental care is almost
exclusively (i.e., 95%) financed on a private basis—one of
the highest levels of private finance among OECD coun-
tries. Vision care is also excluded fromMedicare and not
part of provincial extended health benefit programmes—
though provision is made for both dental and vision care
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 124–132 127
in provincial welfare programmes (Marchildon, 2013).
These private and targeted public programmes have
made the expansion of universalMedicare difficult as the
example of pharmaceuticals illustrate.
Canada is the only high-incomeUHC country inwhich
prescription drugs are not part of the basic UHC coverage.
For decades, arguments have been made to add medi-
cally necessary prescription drugs to Medicare through
a universal Pharmacare programme. However, because
only an estimated 7 percent of the population—largely
the working poor—are financially prevented from access
to necessary medications, the public demand for univer-
sal Pharmacare is relatively weak in Canada (Morgan &
Boothe, 2016). Since 2014, there have been increasing
calls for universal Pharmacare in Canada from policy ex-
perts, organized labour, and some civil society organiza-
tions. In 2018, a Parliamentary Committee reported on
national Pharmacare with a majority report in favour of
adding outpatient drugs to existing provincial and territo-
rial Medicare plans (Parliamentary Standing Committee
on Health, 2018).
In response to this recent pressure, the federal
government established an Advisory Council on the
Implementation of National Pharmacare which deliv-
ered its final report and recommendations in June 2019
(Canada, 2019; Grignon, Longo, Marchildon, & Officer,
2020). The federal government’s response to this report
will be the most important test of the political viability
of the Canadian model of UHC. If the federal govern-
ment decides that pharmaceuticals should be added to
universal coverage on a single-tier and single-payer ba-
sis, the recommendation of the Advisory Council, then
this will demonstrate that the model can evolve toward
greater universalization. If, however, the federal govern-
ment choses to simply fill some obvious gaps or subsidize
premiums for individuals, then this will confirm that the
Canadian model of Medicare is in retreat.
4. Old-Age Pensions
The modern Canadian pension system gradually took
shape during the 1950s and 1960s. As the result of a
series of reforms, multilayered arrangements emerged.
Three main layers comprise this complex pension sys-
tem. First, OAS is a universal flat-rate pension sup-
plemented by the GIS, an income-tested program tar-
geted low-income older people. Second, the CPP and
the QPP are contributory, earning-related public pen-
sion programs. While QPP operates only in the province
of Quebec, CPP covers all workers located outside
that province. Finally, employer-sponsored Registered
Retirement Plans and personal savings accounts known
as Registered Retirement Savings Plans constitute the
voluntary yet tax-subsidized components of this frag-
mented pension system (Béland & Myles, 2005).
Despite this fragmentation, in recent decades, this
system has proved quite effective in reducing poverty
among older people in Canada. For instance, as Michael
Wiseman and Martynas Yčas suggest (2008), poverty
rates among older people are more than three times
lower in Canada than in the United States, another lib-
eral country Canada is regularly compared with. As they
show, in terms of poverty reduction, Canada also per-
forms much better than the UK and as well as Sweden,
a country strongly associated with the universalism and
the social-democratic welfare regime. As they argue, this
surprising performance is related directly to the rela-
tionship between a modest yet universal flat pension—
OAS—and a targeted program—GIS—that supplements
this flat pension (Wiseman & Yčas, 2008). The remainder
of this section focuses on the history and fate of this flat
pension over time.
In 1952, OAS was created as a universal flat pension
offering modest cash benefits (originally 40 dollars CDN
per month) to people aged 70 and older meeting basic
residency criteria. Later on, in 1970, the eligibility age
for OAS was lowered to 65. OAS is a purely federal pro-
gram, a reality that was made possible by a constitu-
tional agreement between the federal government and
the 10 provinces. As for the eligibility criteria, they are
quite stringent, as one needs to reside in Canada for
40 years in order to receive full OAS benefits (Béland &
Myles, 2005).
In the early-mid 1960s, it became clear that, on its
own, OAS could not guarantee the economic security of
millions of retirees, a situation that led to the advent of
CPP andQPP. The addition of these earnings-related com-
ponents to Canada’s pension system was accompanied
by the creation of GIS in 1967. Initially a temporary mea-
sure aimed at supporting low-income older people be-
fore CPP and QPP could pay full pensions, GIS was later
made permanent (Béland & Myles, 2005). GIS has since
remained available to people entitled to OAS benefits
who fall under a minimum level of income.
Like GIS, over time OAS became a widely popular pro-
gram that created large constituencies, a situation that
made itmore resistant to potential retrenchment, in a pol-
icy feedback logic well described by Paul Pierson (1994) in
his now classic book Dismantling the Welfare State? This
resistance to direct and explicit retrenchment became ob-
vious in the early-mid 1980s, when Canada, like many
other advanced industrial countries, faced large public
deficits, which led politicians to look for potential fis-
cal savings through cutbacks in social programs. Because
OAS is financed through general revenues, it became an
obvious target during that period. Concerns about the
long-term consequences of demographic aging also fu-
eled fiscal anxiety about OAS. It is in this context that,
in themid-1980s, newly-elected Progressive Conservative
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney attempted to save the
federal government money by partially deindexing OAS
pensions, which would penalize both current and future
retirees while reducing the long-term fiscal liability of
the federal government. In part because Mulroney had
promised to spare OAS from such cuts during the 1984
federal campaign, the announcement about the deindex-
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ing ofOASpensions less than a year after the election infu-
riated many older voters, who took the streets to protest
against the proposed measure. In the end, facing much
criticism, the Mulroney government withdrew from the
OAS retrenchment proposal. Yet, four years later, as part
of its 1989 budget, the Mulroney government success-
fully implemented a low-profile fiscal “claw back” of OAS
benefits from high income older people. This meant that,
currently, 2.2 percent of eligible older people are subject
to the full repayment of their OAS pension, while another
4.7 percent are subject to a partial repayment (Office of
the Chief Actuary, 2017, p. 89). Better-off older people
who receive OAS can minimize the claw back or withhold-
ing tax on their benefit through various financial maneu-
vers: by splitting pension income with their spouse, gen-
erating non-taxable investment income, and making use
of income tax deductions to lower their net income. Of
course, such measures are less likely available to older
people with modest income. This example of “social pol-
icy by stealth” (Gray, 1990) or, what we would call, partial
de-universalization, is consistent with the Pierson’s argu-
ment that obfuscation is a potentially effective retrench-
ment strategy (Pierson, 1994).
The 1989 claw back allowed the federal government
to save somemoney on the back of well-off older people,
preserving the formal universality of OAS even while un-
dermining it in practice. Less than a decade later, in 1996,
the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien announced a
pension reform initiative that would formally end univer-
sality (that is, total de-universalization) by replacing both
OAS and GIS with a new income-tested Seniors’ Benefit
that would especially benefit low-income older people
(Battle, 1997). To reduce potential opposition to a mea-
sure that would further penalize high income older peo-
ple, the change was designed not to affect current re-
tirees. Despite this blame avoidance strategy (Weaver,
1986), the Seniors’ Benefit faced much criticism from
both the left (because of the way in which benefits for
couples would be calculated) and the right (because its
income-test was seen as penalizing seemingly responsi-
ble workers who save enough for retirement on their
own). In the end, as federal budget surpluses started
to materialize in the late 1990s, the Seniors’ Benefit
seemed less and less necessary and, in the face of crit-
icisms, the Liberal government withdrew its proposal in
1998 (Béland & Myles, 2005).
The Seniors’ Benefit was the only major attempt to
formally end universality in old-age pensions. After the
late 1990s, the only direct effort to retrench OAS oc-
curred in 2012, when a federal Conservative government
announced a gradual increase in the eligibility age of OAS
and GIS benefits from 65 to 67 between 2023 and 2029.
Immediately decried by the Liberal Party of Canada and
the New Democratic Party, this increase was cancelled in
2016 by the newly-elected Liberal government of Justin
Trudeau (Harris, 2016).
Overall, it is clear that OAS has been largely spared
from extensive, direct retrenchment, which is not the
case of other Canadian social programs such as federal
Employment Insurance (Campeau, 2005) and provincial
social assistance (Béland & Daigneault, 2015). Yet, this
situation should not obscure the long-term impact of
low-profile yet consequential provisions like the ongoing
claw backwhich erodes universality over time, and index-
ation mechanisms which reduces the real value of OAS
benefits over time. Although the impact of demographic
aging on OAS spending may prove relatively limited, the
gradual erosion of the real value of universal benefits
means that they will play an increasingly minor role com-
pared to other components of Canada’s fragmented pen-
sion system, including GIS (Béland & Marier, 2019). This
means that, although universality has been relatively re-
silient within Canada’s pension system, the relative role
of OAS as a source of economic security is diminishing
within that system, a situation reinforced by the recently
announced expansions of CPP and QPP, which will in-
crease the scope of earnings-related pensions. On the
whole, we can talk about a formal resilience of univer-
sality but a relative weakening of its relative importance
within the country’s pension system.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Universalism, universality, and universalization—central
concepts in our analytical approach—represent salient
political ideas, significant policy tools, and societal
change processes in contemporary public affairs. While
universality based on citizenship or residency undergirds
government intervention in health care and old age pen-
sions in Canada (and in elementary and secondary edu-
cation), other approaches based on social insurance and
selective targeting operate simultaneously. The politics
of universality are multiple, relating to diverse values
and beliefs, several policy instruments and administra-
tive techniques, and demographic and socio-economic
trends. Universalism and universality intermingle with
other political ideas and policy instruments in both com-
plementary and contentiousways. Debates centre on the
quality of public services, the generosity of income ben-
efits, the mode of funding programs, the coverage of the
population, and the intended results perceived for fam-
ilies, gender relations, markets, governments, and soci-
ety overall. In the political life and public discourse of
Canada’s liberal welfare regime, major ideas include in-
dividual and family responsibility, personal achievement,
and the work ethic alongside equality of opportunity,
equal access to services, and regional equity.
As a public policy technique or instrument, universal-
ity gives expression to social citizenship rights and com-
munity membership. By comparison, as a policy tool, so-
cial insurance relates personal (premium) contributions
and workforce attachment to protection against certain
shared risks or contingencies of life. Income-tested ben-
efits and fee subsidies acknowledge differential house-
hold incomes and the (in)ability to pay, while social as-
sistance and means testing place emphasis on basic liv-
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ing needs, human vulnerability, rationing of public re-
sources, and welfare subsistence.
One of the reasons for the contested nature of univer-
sality is that there is no single model of universal policy
program design across countries and periods. This was
demonstrated by our analysis of the historical develop-
ment and the politics of provincial UHC since the 1960s
and at the evolution of the federal OAS program since
its creation in the early 1950s. In Canada, the trajectory
of universality has been and remains uneven and varies
from one policy area to the next. The example of pen-
sions also illustrates how the interaction among public
social programs takes place in a broader institutional and
discursive context of liberalism in which private benefits
play amajor role alongside public policy programs. These
private pension and savings schemes remain voluntary
in nature, and therefore offer coverage that is far from
universal. At the same time, these private programs are
publicly supported through tax expenditure subsidies. In
pension policy, we see the interplay of different political
discourses (universalism and individualism) and program
designs (universality and selectivity).
Universalization directs attention to whether a social
program or policy field is becoming more universal in
terms of its design elements and dominant ideas in the
environment.With respect tomedicare, we see renewed
efforts at upholding the universal features of access and
coverage through federal and provincial reinvestments
over the past ten to fifteen years, following a period of
fiscal restraint. The federal universal elderly benefit, OAS,
has also gone through swings in recent times.
More generally, the varieties of policy program de-
sign are important when the time comes to analyze the
meaning of universality and universalism within a coun-
try’s welfare regime. For instance, although Canada is
widely understood as a liberal welfare regime, its pub-
lic health care system largely operates according to a uni-
versal logic associated with the social democratic regime.
As for Canada’s pension system, it is liberal in nature
in the sense that public benefits are relatively modest
and that social assistance, in the form of GIS, plays a
key role within that system. Yet, this system, which fea-
tures a mix of universal, social insurance, and social as-
sistance benefits, offers surprisingly positive outcomes
in terms of poverty reductions that are closer to the
results of social-democratic welfare states of Denmark
and Sweden than the more liberal regimes in the United
Kingdom and the United States (Wiseman & Yčas, 2008).
This points, once again, to the need to study the inter-
action among different types of social programs, which
varies over time and across policy areas within the same
country. In the end, our analysis points to the need to
study the evolution and interaction among concrete pol-
icy instruments to grasp the nature and evolution of uni-
versality. Universality and its associated concepts of uni-
versalism and universalization, along with related ideas
of selectivity and social insurance, must be appreciated
in the actual institutional and temporal contexts in which
they operate andwhich, in turn, influence their goals, de-
sign, and practices. This broad lesson applies to liberal
regimes and we believe scholars studying other coun-
tries could find this approach useful. Because at least
some key universal programs are there to stay even in a
liberal country like Canada, more scholarship is needed
about the historical development of and the contempo-
rary debates over universalism, universality, and univer-
salization, in advanced industrial nations and elsewhere
around the world.
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